In order to comprehend the gravity of the Michigan State Police crime lab system as the most problematic forensic DNA organization in America, it is necessary to scrutinize only one decisive case. Mr. Gary Leiterman, a lifelong registered nurse, was illegitimately identified by DNA, falsely accused, and wrongfully prosecuted. The man eventually died from medical complications, while under the incompetent care of the Michigan Department of Corrections.
The case: During the early morning hours of March 21, 1969, Jane Mixer—a 23-year-old University of Michigan law student—was shot to death in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Due to the absence of any investigative leads over a protracted time frame, Jane's murder was assumed to be part of a series of homicides occurring in the Ann Arbor/Ypsilanti Michigan area between July 1967 and July 1969. Those well-known ‘Michigan Murders’ were later attributed to the confirmed serial killer, John Norman Collins—AKA: the ‘Co-ed Killer’.
In early 2002, cold case investigators took possession of the 33-year-old evidence items—collected from the Jane Mixer murder investigation. Beginning in March 2002, forensic examination of these items was conducted by a Michigan State Police crime lab DNA analyst. The analyst reported two distinctly different male DNA profiles from two evidence items. A number of months later, these two unknown male profiles were uploaded into the Combined DNA Indexing System (CODIS) for comparison to other DNA profiles—housed within this database.
In December 2003, a database match was achieved from a DNA profile within a blood deposit that had been scraped from Jane Mixer’s left hand—thirty-three years earlier—as part of the woman’s autopsy. This DNA profile matched a convicted offender by the name of Mr. John Ruelas. The known DNA profile for Ruelas had been entered into the CODIS database—as a consequence of his 2002 conviction for murdering his mother—Ms. Margaret Ruelas.
Eight months later, in August 2004, a 2nd CODIS database hit suggested an association between the Jane Mixer case evidence and the known DNA profile from Gary Leiterman. The reason the man’s DNA profile had been placed within the CODIS database was as follows: In 2001, Gary became addicted to the prescription drug, Vicodin. The pain killer was initially prescribed for Gary’s severe back pain. An unfortunate drug addiction led to a prescription fraud charge. In December, 2001, Gary successfully completed a 3-month drug rehabilitation program in a private clinic. He also completed the required one year court sponsored drug rehabilitation program which ultimately cleared him of the felony conviction arising from his drug-related charges.
Despite being cleared of the felony conviction, Gary’s CODIS DNA reference sample arrived at the MSP crime lab on February 22, 2002. The arrival of this first DNA reference sample from Mr. Leiterman was within 24 hours after the Margaret Ruelas murder case items were initially opened for analysis in the very same section of the MSP crime lab.
When the December 2003, CODIS hit identified John Ruelas as a potential perpetrator of the Jane Mixer homicide, the cold case investigation team had to be exceptionally pleased with the DNA breakthrough. However, the enthusiasm faded when MSP crime lab personnel realized that John Ruelas was only 37-years-old. This exposed the fact that—in March, 1969—young Ruelas was a 4-year-old child.
Initially, it was hoped that Ms. Mixer’s left hand scraping of blood/DNA—matching John Ruelas—did indeed come from the 4-year-old child, who was inexplicably present at the 1969 homicide scene. However, as more and more facts were uncovered, they overwhelmingly contradicted such an outlandish hope. From the moment that the John Ruelas CODIS hit was discovered, through the present date, exhaustive investigative efforts have failed to reveal any hint of a personal connection between young Ruelas, Gary Leiterman, or Ms. Mixer.
Ms. Mixer was shot twice in the head. Logic dictates that the blood on her hand most likely originated from her own head wounds. An abundance of blood from Jane was observed all over her body—as well as her clothing. Despite the coherence tied to these realities, the prosecution team—as they prepared for Gary Leiterman’s trial—embraced an incredibly ridiculous notion. They convinced themselves that young Ruelas was somehow present at the homicide—regardless of the facts demanded by logic. Thus, perhaps a 4-year-old boy merely experienced a nosebleed at this murder scene. This wildly irrational hypothetical ignores all of the following: 1) No connection was ever found between Jane Mixer, young John Ruelas, or any individuals among the Mixer/Ruelas families; 2) Gary Leiterman traveled to Ann Arbor for the purpose of murdering a complete stranger; 3) Despite the absence of any connection between Gary, young John Ruelas, or any individuals among the Leiterman/Ruelas families, Gary recruited the 4-year old child for the purpose of witnessing the crime he was preparing to commit; 4) Gary somehow allowed this small child to drip his blood onto the hand of the gunshot victim; 5) Despite the bizarre nature of Gary’s decision to include a complete stranger, a child at this scene, no individual among the family or friends of young John Ruelas has any recollection that the child was ever missing on any night, around March of 1969. And this was despite the fact that Jane Mixer’s time of death was estimated to be between midnight and 3:00 a.m.; 6) Gary somehow remained undetected, as he returned the toddler back to his home; 7) Keeping in mind Mr. Leiterman’s unprovoked brutality against a woman he did not know, the man somehow lost his appetite for committing such random crimes. Gary was never arrested nor convicted of a single, subsequent, violent event—between March 1969, and the date of his well-publicized 2004 arrest—as a suspect in the Jane Mixer homicide. This was a span of thirty-five years; 8) Young John Ruelas grew up to—himself—become a murderer; 9) Most astonishing, we arrive at the crown jewel of all coincidences. While one MSP 2002 homicide investigation targeted 37-year-old John Ruelas, a 2nd MSP 2002 investigation targeted the 1969 Jane Mixer cold case homicide. The forensic biology/DNA analytical phases of both of these investigations were conducted at the same time, ...and within the very same crime lab in Lansing, Michigan.
Ridiculously, observers of the cumulative actual case facts are expected to trust that it is more likely that all of these breathtaking coincidences somehow became perfectly aligned. Alternatively, we can choose to simply suspect that—not one, but TWO—DNA cross-contamination events occurred during the processing of evidence from an MSP crime lab case. Here, the question of Gary Leiterman’s guilt-versus-the profoundly obvious contamination event, can be explored by considering what is known as Occam’s Razor, also referred to as the Law of Parsimony. This problem-solving principle predicts that—in a search for the most likely explanation—the path that requires the fewest complicating elements, is usually the correct one. Thus, the simplest path is best. Logic dictates that the Michigan State Police botched their analysis, backpedaled skillfully, and covered up their mistakes—at the expense of Gary’s freedom.
In 2005, Gary Leiterman was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. From the moment of his arrest in 2004, throughout his trial, and throughout all of his years of wrongful imprisonment, Gary maintained that he had nothing to do with the murder of Jane Mixer. During his trial, the jury heard testimony from the MSP crime lab analyst who was assigned to analyze the John Ruelas homicide case. This analyst was questioned about receiving a call from her supervisor—shortly after the realization that DNA linked to her case had *somehow* ended up on evidence that was being examined by one of her co-workers. The Ruelas case analyst was commanded to return from her current MSP-Grand Rapids Lab location, to discuss concerns about the timing and details of her analysis. Again, her supervisor’s principle concern—undoubtedly—was a consequence of the potentially catastrophic detection of an out-of-place 4-year-old on the Jane Mixer homicide evidence—from 1969.
Transcripts from her testimony reveal the following: “My supervisor telephoned me and asked me to come to Lansing to review my notes from my analysis from this homicide that I received from Jackson and to make a timeline as to when I performed the steps of my analysis in order to—for him to make a comparison to the timing of the analysis of the samples for the Mixer case.” Question from Gary’s defense counsel: “All right, and are you aware of when there was an overlap in those timelines?” Response from the Ruelas case analyst: “I believe there was an overlap in some of the sample handling, but I’m not exactly sure what the dates are or what the overlap of the sampling would be.”
It is genuinely
alarming to observe a transcript exposing such vague testimony—regarding
recorded dates/times from a forensic DNA testing facility. Refer to the
rigorous standards for maintenance of records, which have been established by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Scientific Working Group on
DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM). Within that context, the Ruelas case analyst was “…not exactly sure…”
when specific stages of her analysis were conducted. Equally alarming, this
acknowledged lack of attention to detail must be taken together with
the fact that the analyst was commanded by her supervisor to travel 68 miles,
in order to discuss “...what the overlap
of the sampling would be...” relevant to the Ruelas case—by comparison to the Mixer cold case evidence analysis.
Referring to the records from Gary Leiterman’s trial, it is illuminating to note that the Jane Mixer homicide DNA analyst testified that his evidence analysis began on March 22, 2002. This establishes that evidence item handling, sampling, and analysis—from both the Mixer and Ruelas cases—took place during overlapping time frames, in early 2002. These processing steps also occurred within the exact same crime lab facility, on laboratory bench spaces that were separated by no more than a few feet. Even more disturbing, CODIS DNA sample extractions—the source of material from which Gary’s DNA was typed for his known profile—were routinely conducted on a bench immediately adjacent to the laboratory area used for the analysis of the Jane Mixer case evidence.
Blood/DNA collected from any victim’s hand, onto a cotton swab, and stored within unknown locations, under undefined conditions of temperature and humidity, for thirty-three years, can be expected to undergo a substantial degree of decomposition. There is no doubt that the introduction of pristine, non-degraded DNA from John Ruelas was due to evidence mishandling and case-to-case cross-contamination of biological material—within the MSP crime lab. It is also clear that any quality control/quality assurance measures—designed to alert analysts of potential DNA contamination errors—failed to provide any clues that this specific cross-contamination event had occurred.
The MSP crime lab—throughout 2002—was prone to quality control malfunctions and defective analysis. One vital indication of this was verified when the Jane Mixer homicide DNA analyst documented that he had subjected post-amplification polymerase chain reaction (PCR) products to what is referred to as a ‘Microcon®—based DNA clean-up procedure’. This supplemental step in the process was conducted at the urging of Charles Barna—the infamous MSP Crime Lab DNA Unit Director—during the time that these cases were handled/analyzed in early 2002. In addition to being enormously ill-advised, this DNA clean-up step was never validated by the MSP crime lab for use on post-amplification PCR products.
As a consequence of attempting this problematic DNA clean-up process, Charles Barna and the Jane Mixer homicide DNA analyst recklessly introduced enormous, unnecessary risks of DNA cross-contamination events within the MSP crime lab. These risks were compounded by the fact that utilizing any non-validated method is an inexcusable violation of universally-recognized quality control standards for DNA analysis laboratories. For clarification, refer to the July 1, 2020, Federal Bureau of Investigation’s “Quality Assurance Standards For DNA Databasing Laboratories”. One can also refer to any publications released by the Scientific Working Group On DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM) website: https://www.swgdam.org/publications The jury assigned to Gary Leiterman’s trial was completely unaware of these facts.
During Gary’s trial, MSP crime lab analysts and supervisors testified that no DNA contamination events were ever detected. These claims were inaccurate and patently misleading to the jurors. Within the case file was an electropherogram bearing the label, “Negative Control 041902”. This control sample was analyzed by the Mixer homicide DNA analyst on Tuesday, May 7, 2002. Near the bottom of this data printout, a handwritten note exposed the following revelation: “Note: Contaminant detected in ProfilerPlus microconed product (~15 µl)-However, not detected in Cofiler microconed product (~15 µl)-Lab personnel excluded-Co-amplified samples excluded-Action—microcon remaining product.”
This notation established that yet another contamination event (other than the John Ruelas-related blunder) did indeed occur during analysis of Jane's homicide case. It also establishes multiple instances of the Jane Mixer homicide DNA analyst, subjecting post-amplification products to the ‘Microcon®—based ‘DNA clean-up’ procedures that were unfortunately encouraged by Charles Barna. These clean-up procedures were carried out in close proximity to the lab benches where various CODIS samples—including Gary’s DNA reference sample—were processed for DNA. It is noteworthy that the tenure of Charles Barna came abruptly to an end—as a consequence of a 2004 MSP Internal Affairs investigation into questionable laboratory practices, including allegations that proficiency tests were falsified.
Despite Barna’s position as the Director of the MSP Crime Lab DNA Unit, he was apparently unaware of the following realities of forensic DNA casework: 1) Post-amplification PCR products require handling with extreme caution; 2) Genetic typing efforts from ‘Low Copy Number’ (LCN) quantities of DNA provide notoriously unreliable data; 3) Contamination disasters are being invited into your crime lab, when attempts are made to overcome LCN DNA quantity limitations, by directing analysts to resort to non-validated post-amplification manipulations of the genetic material.
Individuals doubting the innocence of Mr. Gary Leiterman might point to the fact that the CODIS hit came from a relatively incriminating location—a pair of pantyhose recovered from the Jane Mixer homicide scene. Despite the prosecution’s speculation that the ‘discolorations’ sampled from these pantyhose were from drops of the killer’s perspiration—there are no existing forensic biological tests for sweat!
Regarding the persistence of DNA handling/contamination issues within the Michigan State Police facilities, it is truly eye-opening to refer to the July 14, 2005, testimony from the Margaret Ruelas homicide case DNA analyst. The Leiterman trial transcript shows the following question from the defense: “And then, when all of that is done, I would assume that there is a log kept, or some sort of overall record to show the lab’s proficiency in handling these samples?” The analyst responded: “I’m not certain that an error log is kept. I’ve never seen one in the laboratory.” Question: “Who was your supervisor in 2002?” The analyst responded: “Charles Barna.”
The absence of any appropriate, centralized corrective action/quality assurance system within the MSP crime lab system—coupled with this absence of error logs—constitutes a catastrophic deviation from the DNA Advisory Board Quality Assurance Standards, outlined in Appendix II, Section 14.1.1. Without the benefit of any centralized corrective action documentation—no crime laboratory can effectively identify and/or resolve systematic patterns of problems within the scientific casework.
At the forefront of such challenges resides the issue of contamination. Within the testimony record from Gary’s trial, various MSP crime lab analysts and supervisors failed to provide any illuminating commentaries—regarding how management effectively addresses problems with contamination. To this day, no effective corrective action/quality assurance mechanisms exist in those facilities. Rather than maintain a readily accessible compilation of error logs, analysts are directed—upon observation of any contamination events—to simply make a note *somewhere* in the case file. DNA lab auditors should note: this practice gives the appearance of burying, or hindering the discovery of multiple-case patterns of DNA contamination.
Recall that DNA, presumed to be Gary's ‘sweat', was reported on the pantyhose recovered from the Jane Mixer homicide scene. A multitude of disturbing coincidences point to this finding as—yet another carefully concealed MSP crime lab cross-contamination malfunction. It is illuminating to reference information memorialized within a publication released in June 2012 by the United States National Institute of Justice (NIJ). This 177-page publication is entitled: “DNA for the Defense Bar”. Refer to Chapter 9, which covers “Delayed Prosecutions, Cold Case Hits and CODIS”. Within this chapter, refer to Page 125—where the authors state as follows: “To participate in NDIS, states must sign a Memorandum of Understanding verifying that the submitting laboratory is in compliance with the FBI’s quality assurance standards.” Recall that—during the time frame of the John Ruelas contamination event, in 2002—the basic policy of the MSP crime lab was to dodge any responsibility of maintaining proper corrective action records. To this day—MSP crime lab management continues to insist that DNA contamination events require only an informal notation—somewhere in the case file.
Further into Chapter 9, Section 5 of the NIJ publication is entitled: “Review the Match Report Carefully”. On Page 127—the authors wrote as follows: “If the match is to a suspect profile generated and entered by the same LDIS lab, be sure to compare when the client’s DNA was originally entered into the databank and when the evidence profile was entered. Was the evidence profile generated before the client’s profile was generated for any case? Or was it generated before the client’s profile was generated for the present case? The development of the evidence profile before the client’s profile minimizes the risk that the evidence was mistyped or cross-contaminated.”
In the instance of the DNA match to Mr. Gary Leiterman, answers to these operative questions can never be illuminated: “Was this DNA match reviewed carefully by the MSP crime lab? Was it carefully reviewed by counsel for Gary’s defense, by counsel for the prosecution—and most important—by the jury?” Profoundly, the answers to these questions are addressed in the 2012 NIJ “DNA for the Defense Bar” document. Refer to Chapter 9, Section 9, which bears the title: “Contamination”. On Page 137, this section of the document reveals the following: “Questions remain about the 1969 murder of a Michigan woman. In December 2003, police received a DNA match based on a cold hit of an evidence sample, but the matched person was only 4 years old at the time of the woman’s death. A sample from another convicted offender was tested at the same lab and matched another item of evidence in the case. Police have failed to come up with an explanation for the first match; there was no obvious evidence of laboratory contamination. The second match was eventually tried and convicted on the basis of his DNA match. The case is currently under appeal.”
Without a doubt, this contamination case example refers to none other than the John Ruelas contamination event—as well as the enormously flawed conviction of Mr. Gary Leiterman. Interestingly, the NIJ authors avoided identifying the specific facility responsible for this dismal attempt at scientific analysis. Most mystifying, Gary remained incarcerated—as the faulty scientific aspects of the Jane Mixer homicide investigation continued to evade any sensible degree of scrutiny.
Let us assume that the detection of Gary’s DNA was—yet another, a third instance—of a DNA contamination event—during analysis of the Jane Mixer homicide evidence. But how exactly could this event have occurred? Recall that the Leiterman CODIS DNA reference sample arrived at the MSP crime lab facility on February 22, 2002. Coincidentally, this arrival date was only one day after the Ruelas murder case evidence items were first laid out for examination in the MSP crime lab.
The initial test date for Gary Leiterman’s CODIS DNA reference sample was presumed to be sometime between July 17, 2002 and July 23, 2002. In addition to the glaring fact that the precise date of testing remains unclear, it is intriguing to refer to the July 14, 2005 testimony from one of the MSP crime lab’s CODIS sample analysts. The testimony transcript reads as follows: “We do maintain dates about when tests were performed but we don’t typically generate any paperwork when we just process a convicted offender sample to go into CODIS. So, any dates regarding when a sample was handled are stored in various databases at the stations where the action would be performed.” Further into the transcript, the same analyst continued: “All of the information is electronic. We don’t generate any paperwork from the receipt of an offender sample through the input into CODIS.” A bit later, defense counsel asked: “Who actually handled Gary Leiterman’s DNA sample or buccal sample?” Answer: “In this instance, the information that I retrieved from the databases to bring with me today indicates the date that certain samples were handled, but it doesn’t give me any indication as to which individual handled the sample.” In yet another astounding coincidence, this MSP CODIS sample analyst admitted in open court that there was no identifiable person available to question—regarding the detailed steps, or the integrity of the timing/handling of Gary’s CODIS DNA reference sample, between February 22, 2002 and July, 2002.
Most profound, no available analyst could be questioned about the overwhelming revelation that this early 2002 effort failed to generate a DNA profile from Gary’s CODIS DNA reference sample. At this point, one is compelled to ask: “Should such a lack of accountability in handling a CODIS DNA reference sample be considered ‘compliant’ with the FBI’s Quality Assurance Standards?” Additionally, logic dictates that we must ask: “During Gary’s trial, was it feasible for any juror, or anybody else, to ‘Review the Match Carefully’—as mandated by the NIJ?
Noting that this first attempt failed to generate Gary's DNA profile, continued testimony from the MSP crime lab CODIS analyst amazingly exposed the following: “The first time the card was processed, it did not yield a DNA profile. This is not completely uncommon because we are using saliva. ----Sometimes there’s an area that was colored white that really contains mostly saliva and very few cells.”
Was she joking with, "This is not completely uncommon....."? Such an assertion is absolutely perjurious nonsense! Testifying under oath—it is a disgrace to suggest that such a DNA typing calamity could be anything short of a profoundly unexpected, gigantic failure! Note that this MSP CODIS sample analyst was never asked to provide any historical collection of scientific data, regarding this 100% imaginary prevalence of failed saliva standards. Regardless of this ludicrous testimony, such failures are—in the real world—enormously rare events.
In light of the scientific fact that one drop of human saliva contains approximately 500,000 salivary epithelial cells, consider that perhaps only three drops of Gary’s saliva were collected onto his first CODIS DNA reference sample. Once that sample was delivered to the MSP crime lab on February 22, 2002, the projected DNA yield from that meager quantity of saliva should have been sufficient for Gary’s DNA typing—approximately 10,000 times over. Based upon this reality, the vital question persists: “What actually became of Gary’s initial, saliva-soaked CODIS reference sample—within the MSP crime lab?” Although the precise mechanism of mishandling remains unknown, it is probable that this reference sample was the source of the contamination event—leading to the arrest and conviction of an innocent man—Mr. Gary Leiterman. No CODIS sample from Gary was typed for DNA until 18 months after the initial sample mysteriously crashed and burned—sometime around July 2002.
After learning of the John Ruelas contamination event in 2002, one of the MSP Crime Lab DNA Unit supervisors attempted to duplicate the initial findings. This initiative failed to demonstrate reproducibility of the first round of results. In addition to observing no DNA consistent with John Ruelas, this DNA supervisor was unable to confirm any added conclusions that might have provided support for the ridiculously faulty results—which falsely implicated Gary Leiterman.
Added mysterious coincidences must be noted. From both the initial and supplemental rounds of analysis of Jane’s pantyhose, plus analysis of the blood swab from her hand, in addition to Jane's bloody clothing, detection of DNA from Ms. Mixer herself was either very weak, or completely compromised. Although blood is an enormously rich source of DNA, there is no mystery in the fact that DNA can be highly prone to degradation—during thirty-three years of handling/storage under undefined conditions. Despite these facts, the DNA on the pantyhose miraculously generated pristine DNA typing results, pointing to Gary Leiterman.
When the Jane Mixer homicide DNA analyst was questioned about his failed attempt to characterize DNA from the presumed blood on the victim’s hand—his testimony was as follows: Question from the prosecutor: “Did you compare with the presumed sample of Jane Mixer’s blood?” Analyst: “In terms of—I didn’t do it in terms of the report. In looking at it, you could look at the types, and the types are not the same. When the types are not the same, that’s a non-match, therefore Jane Mixer could be excluded. In terms of, well excuse me, in terms of—it was inconclusive because you had additional activity. Excuse me, she could not be excluded. You had additional activity at one of the genetic markers that was a minor donor and it was inconclusive because it did not meet reporting standards, so what that means is that there is not opinion formed to whether she is included or excluded as a possible donor of this sample.”
Was this a modern-day forensic DNA version of Lou Costello questioning Bud Abbott? Perhaps the analyst could have minimized confusion by simply telling the jurors: “No data confirmed the presence or absence of DNA from Ms. Mixer.” The prosecution continued: “Is it—are the results that you are seeing in that particular sample consistent with or inconsistent with this spot of blood having been scraped off Jane Mixer’s hand?” Analyst: “The DNA types that are present are consistent with a, basically, a single source biological sample. In this case, identified as blood.” Note that—with this testimony—the analyst further confused the jurors by disingenuously avoiding clarification that this ‘single source’ was a match to John Ruelas, the 37-year-old suspect from a 2002 homicide case—whose DNA was being analyzed at a work station—located just a few feet away. Wow!
Blood is a profoundly rich source of DNA. Indeed, a single drop of blood contains approximately 400,000 DNA-containing white blood cells. Regardless of the DNA-rich nature of blood, the inescapable fact is the 33 years of evidence handling/storage—and the profound potential for DNA degradation. Upon reviewing the DNA typing electropherograms, the evidence of DNA degradation was quite conspicuous. By contrast, it is remarkably illuminating to observe the much more pristine nature of the DNA results—establishing the presence of John Ruelas—which was clearly the product of a 2002 contamination event. Similarly, the DNA data corresponding to Gary Leiterman—as a ‘presumed sweat’ contributor to the pantyhose—was also extraordinarily pristine.
Considering the 33-year time span between evidence collection and DNA testing, these observations defy the Laws of Thermodynamics, as they apply to biological systems and enzymatic reactions. When DNA from Jane Mixer is observed to be profoundly degraded and nearly undetectable after 33 years, DNA deposited by other individuals—at the same time, on the same evidence—cannot miraculously escape the identical forces of degradation. The only notable DNA types from the Jane Mixer homicide case samples tested by the MSP crime lab were indeed introduced strictly as a consequence of recent evidence mishandling, and contamination events.
Crime lab contamination events and other errors should be compiled and organized into transparently accessible, centralized, corrective action files. When crime lab management endorses a paradigm of denial and concealment, as opposed to a policy of adherence to universally-embraced standards, their casework—and the lab itself—demands careful scrutiny. The John Ruelas DNA detection was clearly a contamination event. Scientific proof that the detection of Gary’s DNA on the pantyhose was yet another cross-contamination event will most likely never be indisputably established. However, such proof should not be required—as a precursor for re-examining the hideous fallacies associated with this investigation, the scientific analysis, and the prosecution’s distortion of the truth—during the trial of Mr. Gary Leiterman.
The NIJ went so far as to reference this specific case as a historically relevant example of DNA contamination. Add in the fact that the scientific trial testimony introduced layers of doubt—regarding the integrity/timing of handling the defendant’s CODIS reference source of DNA—the entire conviction process requires a careful, comprehensive re-examination.
Some might argue that such re-examinations are unnecessary, as the jurors already issued their decision two decades ago, and the convicted person is now deceased. I disagree that the perpetrators of the atrocities described above have any cause to be ‘let off the hook’. Within this article, I have exercised my freedom of speech—offering my opinion—toward designation of the “Worst State DNA Crime Lab in the U.S.”
In 1992, the Innocence Project—New York, was founded by the attorneys, Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld, at the Cardozo School of Law, within Yeshiva University, in New York City, New York. In March, 2018, this outstanding organization agreed to accept Gary Leiterman’s case. On July 4, 2019, Gary Leiterman passed away, in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections.
Michael J. Spence, Ph.D., Spence Forensic Resources
No comments:
Post a Comment